I. INTRODUCTION
In Bracy v. Gramley,' the United States Supreme Court held that a triple-murder defendant, William Bracy, who was convicted by a judge who was subsequently convicted of bribery, showed "good cause" for discovery on his due process claim of judicial bias. 2 The Court stated that the Due Process Clause 3 guarantees a fair trial before a disinterested judge. 4 Here, the presumption in favor of a public official's probity was rebutted by Judge Thomas J. Maloney's criminal convictions Therefore, the defendant, who made specific allegations that his trial judge was biased against him and that his attorney was complicit in the corruption, deserved an opportunity to show that he was entitled to relief. 6 This Note argues that the very fact that Judge Maloney presided over the Bracy trial was a due process violation in and of itself because it denied the accused his right to a fair and impartial judge.
7 This Note also contends that the Court's well established position on judicial bias claims demanded something more than the diffidence shown here; Bracy's conviction should have been reversed outright with orders for a new trial. 8 This Note explores and discounts the possible reasons for the Court's reluctance to act boldly in this case. 9 Finally, this Note concludes that little will change as a result of the Bracy decision un-SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 88 trine grants state courts an opportunity to hear a claim and consider allegations of legal error free of federal interference. While presenting a claim to the highest state court meets the exhaustion mandate, 24 federal courts will consider only those claims of petitioners meeting certain requirements; 2 " 5 a claim must present a cognizable issue for review 2 6 and must clear certain other procedural hurdles 27 for federal jurisdiction to apply. 28 Only those violations of state or federal law rising to a constitutional level, resulting in fundamental unfairness in violation of the Due Process Clause,2 are cognizable in habeas proceedings. 0 Once the procedural hurdles have been cleared, the court will evaluate the alleged error. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 31 the Supreme Court held that when the error complained of is a constiavailable in the courts of the State." See also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986) .
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) . 2' Picardv. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) . 2 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1404. 26 Congress amended the habeas corpus statutes in 1996, decreeing that applications for such relief be denied unless the state court's resolution of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (Supp. 1997) . 27 Aside from the exhaustion doctrine, there are several procedural requirements for habeas review. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) precludes review of "successive" petitions raised on identical, previously ruled upon grounds. However, it should be noted that a petition may not be procedurally prohibited if a petitioner can show "cause" for his default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) . As the Court in Murray explained, the "existence of cause for some procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule... [such as, for example, by showing that the] factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel." Id 28 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1404. 2 The Fourteenth Amendment states in part: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Hartson & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 1401-02; see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984) .
3' 507 U.S. 619 (1993) .
1998]
WHATPRICEJUSTICE? 1091 tutional trial error, the remedy of habeas corpus is appropriate only if the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 32 However, the Court distinguished constitutional trial errors from constitutional structural errors, noting that the latter variety, because of their very insidiousness, require automatic reversal. 3 The Court reasoned that "[t]rial error... is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it 'may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on trial] .,,, Judicial bias, however, is a structural defect not amenable to harmless-error analysis.35 That is, the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant receive a fair trial before a disinterested judge. 6
B. JUDICIAL BIAS
The test used to evaluate judicial bias claims was established in Tumey v. Ohio. 37 Ed Tumey was arrested, charged with unlawful possession of an intoxicating liquor, and brought before the 32 Id at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) ).
"Id. at 629-30. 3 ' Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 279; 307 (1991) ). Continuing, the Court said that " [a] t the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards... [tihe existence of such defects... requires automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process. " Id. sSullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 283 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (listingjudicial bias as one of the "three constitutional errors that could not be categorized as harmless error"); Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996) (commenting that "judicial bias is one of those structural defects.., that automatically entitle a petitioner for habeas corpus to a new trial").
Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1799. In Marshall v.Jerrico, Inc., the Supreme Court said: The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.... The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done," by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) The Court cited a series of lower court decisions for the proposition that disqualification is required when those acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial role have an interest in the controversy to be decided. 7 The real question, the Court continued, is "to what degree or nature" the interest must be." 8 The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee clearly is violated if the judge has "a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against [a defendant] weigh against his acquittal," because such concerns lie outside the issue of guilt or innocence. 50 The Court established a strict standard by which future tribunals would evaluate judicial bias claims:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.
51
The Court emphasized that, even though all judges might not be tempted by the prospect of a $12 windfall, 2 such a hairtrigger standard was necessary. 3 The Court explained that "the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice." 5'4 This served as the standard in the few Supreme Court judicial bias cases that have come to bar in the seventy years 59-60 (1972) . "In reMurchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) . The Court addressed the question of "whether a contempt proceeding.., complies with the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal where the same judge presiding at the contempt hearing had also served as the 'one-man grand jury' out of which the contempt charges arose." Id. at 134. The Court held in a 6-to-3 decision that, under these circumstances, the petitioners' due process rights were violated. IR. at 139.
.7 Id. at 136.
5Id.
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fled that the American judicial system requires an unusually strict standard for the adjudication of judicial bias claims: " [O] ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." 9 Whether a claim presents such a possibility depends upon the context and the nature of the interest.° Characterizing the Tumey standard as appropriate, the Court voiced its intention to err on the side of caution: "Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice.'
61
In a case remarkably similar to Tumey, the Supreme Court in Ward again held that a defendant tried before a mayor's court was denied the due process right to a fair trial before an impartial judicial officer. 62 The Court based its holding on the principles laid down in Tumey, specifically invoking the Tumey "test."
The Court further asserted that for a judge to be deemed biased he need not share directly in the fines levied by his court.6 This condition "did not define the limits of the principle" governing judicial bias claims.r That principle requires nothing more than a possible temptation that might lead a judge to be biased.6 The Court concluded that the circumstances under which the petitioner was convicted were constitutionally infirm:
Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court. This [as in Tumey] is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies two practi-59 1&.
Id.
61 Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) When constitutional error calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting harm. Accordingly, when the trial judge is discovered to have had some basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from review, and we must presume that the process was impaired. The Court bolstered this proposition with reference to Tumey, noting that the Tumey Court reversed the conviction despite the lack of evidence that bias actually played a role in the decisionmaking process. 72 In Tumey, it was the mayor's financial interest in the proceedings that satisfied the "possible temptation" requirement. 73 87 Nellum arrived at the apartment several minutes later and saw Collins, Bracy, and Hooper holding the three bound victims at gun-point.8 Collins handed the keys to his Cadillac to Nellum, asking that Nellum pick him up after he (Collins) "drop[p~d] some people off." 9 Nellum then watched as they placed the three victims in a red Oldsmobile. 9 Collins drove the Oldsmobile to the viaduct, with Hooper in the passenger seat and the three victims in the rear. 91 Bracy followed in his own car. 92 At Collins' request, Nellum waited several minutes after the other two vehicles left before following them to the viaduct. 93 Upon arriving at the viaduct, Nellum heard a number of gunshots.9 4 He saw Bracy, carrying a sawed-off shotgun, and Hooper emerge from the viaduct and run to Bracy's car.5 Collins got into the Cadillac with Nellum, and the two cars returned to the parking lot at 2240 South State Street.6 Collins and Nellum then drove to Lake Michigan where they disposed of two handguns. 97 In 1981 
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Judge Thomas J. Maloney in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.9 The jury found Bracy guilty on all counts, and Judge Maloney sentenced him to death.'0°T hroughout the criminal proceedings, Judge Maloney made numerous discretionary rulings 0 1 that "potentially affected the outcome of' Bracy's case.
For example, Maloney appointed his former associate, Robert McDonald, to represent Bracy throughout the trial and sentencing hearing. 0 3 Judge Maloney excused for cause the only African-American jury panel member.' 4 Maloney denied co-defendant Collins' motion to suppress evidence and his request for a separate penalty hearing.' 05 He rejected jury instructions proffered by the defense and, prior to the penalty phase and despite McDonald's claimed lack of preparedness, declined to grant a continuance.'0 Finally, over defense counsel's objection, Judge Maloney admitted evidence of an unadjudicated Arizona homicide that implicated Bracy. 07 Notwithstanding the suspect nature of these rulings, on direct appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Bracy's convictions and two of the three sentences-reducing the aggravated kidnapping penalty to thirty years imprisonment. 1 08 The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of a continuance prior to the death sentencing hearing.'9 While in prison, Bracy filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Illinois Post Conviction 
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In August, 1993, having exhausted his state remedies, Bracy petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus relief.' Bracy alleged a violation of his constitutional right to due process by reason ofjudicial corruption.
12 3 He claimed that, because of Judge Maloney's practice of taking bribes from certain defendants in exchange for acquittal, the judge was actually biased against the defense in those cases in which he was not paid off. 24 Bracy further alleged that Maloney's bias against him, intended to camouflage his corruption and allay any suspicion of wrongdoing, resulted in pro-prosecution rulings, particularly on discretionary matters.'5 Bracy's new attorney, handling the habeas corpus matter, argued that many of Maloney's discretionary rulings disfavored the defense; he sought additional discovery on the issue of actual bias. 26 Newly discovered evidence indicated thatJudge Maloney received bribes in criminal cases in the early 1980s, contemporaneous with Bracy's case. 7 In fact, the evidence confirmed that Maloney fixed murder trials immediately prior to and after Bracy's trial.
In " Id. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that, because habeas corpus is such an extraordinary remedy-upsetting as it does a court's final judgment-discovery must be granted only for "good cause." Id. Bracy's discovery requests, the court found, were either unnecessary or frivolous. Id. at 690-91. First, the request to examine Maloney's bribery-free cases for a pro-prosecution pattern did not require formal discovery since those cases were a matter of public record. Id. Second, the request to view Government materials pertaining to the Maloney prosecution would be satisfied upon a reading and analysis of the transcript. Id. at 691. Though admitting that the trial record had been sealed since August of 1994, the court implied that a year and a half to search the record should have been sufficient. Id. The court dismissed as a fishing expedition the third discovery request to depose some of Maloney's former associates on the subject of non-bribery cases. Id. at 690-91. Because these readily available alternatives to formal discovery uncovered no evidence of bias in Bracy's trial, "the probability is slight that a program of depositions aimed at crooks and their accomplices and likely to be derailed in any event by real and feigned lapses of memory will yield such evidence." Id. at 691.
Id. at 696 (RovnerJ., dissenting). '"Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 726 (1997) .
5 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 , 1795 (1997 Third, Bracy's case was squeezed in between two other murder trials in whichJudge Maloney received bribes. ' In order to establish entitlement to discovery, a party must produce "some evidence tending to show the existence of the ,9 Id. However, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted, because "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard," issues addressing the fitness of ajudge to hear a case rarely rise to the level of a constitutional question. Id.
,Id. Bracy alleged that "Maloney's taking of bribes from some criminal defendants not only rendered him biased against the State in those cases, but also induced a sort of compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe Maloney." Id. (emphases in original). He also claimed that " [t] here is cause to believe that Judge Maloney's discretionary rulings in this case may have been influenced by a desire on his part to allay suspicion of his pattern of corruption and dishonesty" and to avoid the appearance of being soft on crime. Id. at 1798.
. Id-at 1797-98. Noting only that Bracy's convictions had been upheld twice by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Supreme Court offered no opinion on whether these discretionary rulings were correct. Id. at 1798 n.6. Bracy alleged that Robert McDonald was in league with Judge Maloney and privy to his corrupt practices and therefore had agreed to take the case on a no-hassle fast-track basis so as to camouflage the suspicious circumstances of the two contemporaneous, fixed trials 6 2
The Court particularly focused on Maloney's extensive corruption. 63 Relying on the United States proffer," the Court noted that "although [it is] difficult to imagine, Thomas Maloney's life of corruption was considerably more expansive than proved at trial."' Maloney "fixed serious felony cases regularly while a practicing criminal defense attorney" and this corruption continued into his judicial tenure. 1 6 Through his political and organized crime connections, Maloney maintained an ongoing relationship with corrupt judges, deputy sheriffs, bailiffs, several lawyers, and scores of underworld figures. 6 7 The Court "' United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 Ct. , 1488 Ct. (1996 . The Court in Armstrong, after offering a variety of alternative labels for the showing such as "colorable basis, substantial threshold showing, substantial and concrete basis, or reasonable likelihood," appeared to settle on "some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements." Id. The Court acknowledged that public officials are presumed to have carried out their responsibilities properly, and that, were this presumption not "soundly rebutted," it might have concurred with the Seventh Circuit decision that Bracy's theories were too speculative to warrant discovery. 1 6 However, based on Bracy's showing, the Court held that he should have been granted discovery pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) to further develop his plausible claims of judicial bias. 170 The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court in Bracy v. Gramley correctly ruled that Bracy had shown "good cause" for discovery on his judicial bias claim, it should have gone further. The Bracy Court confined its review to the narrow habeas question, refusing to acknowledge that issue's ultimate irrelevance compared to the violation of Bracy's due process rights. Judge Maloney's presiding over the Bracy trial was a due process violation in and of itself, which deprived Bracy of his right to a fair and impartial judge. As such, Bracy's conviction should have been reversed outright.
Judicial bias infected Bracy's trial. This is true irrespective of whether one applies the narrow or broad Tumey standard.
when Swano failed to offer Maloney a bribe and, in bribe negotiations in a later case, Maloney's bag man Robert McGee admitted as much." Id& at 1797 n.5. A former public defender, Swano testified that he learned that, in order "to practice in front of Judge Maloney... we had to pay." Id.
' ad. at 1799.
169 id 170 i.
7 Id. at 1799-800.
'7In a footnote the Court commented: The dissenting [7th Circuit] judge insisted that petitioner had shown "good cause" for discovery to support his judicial bias claim, and went on to state that, in her view, petitioner was entitled to relief whether or not he could prove that Maloney's corruption had any impact on his trial. The latter conclusion, of course, would render irrelevant the discovery-related question presented in this case. Id. at 1796 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
The broad and sweeping propositions found in post-Tumeyjudicial bias cases have been circumscribed and tempered somewhat by invocation of Tumey's "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary" language. 3 Despite the Court's bold words stating that "every procedure" offering a mere "possible temptation" to be biased violates due process, 74 the Court rarely disqualifies judges who do not have some sort of pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case.' 75 Arguably, Tumey offers a narrower, more financially focused standard than that found in Murchison or Ward."
76 However, the Court has never stated this; it appears to view Tumey and its progeny as one coherent monolith, the latter completely consistent and compatible with the former.1 77 Additionally, some commentators argue that there are actually two standards for evaluating judicial bias claims-the broad standard established by the Tumey test proscribing "every procedure which would offer a possible temptation;" and the narrow standard, also originating in Tumey, implying that an interest must be "direct, personal ... [and] pecuniary."' 78 Even under the most restrictive reading of Tumey, Maloney still should be condemned as biased because he had a "pecuniary" stake in the outcome of Bracy's trial. Moreover, Judge Maloney's interest was sufficiently "direct." However, this narrow reading requiring a pecuniary interest is inappropriate; an arbitrary financial/non-financial distinction is not strongly supported by the most prominent judicial bias decisions. In fact, the language in Tumey and its progeny more strongly supports the broader standard'7 9 for evaluating judicial bias claims. Under this broader reading, '7 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) . See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
... Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added). '7' Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 500-01. '76 That is, although the Court in Tumey, Murchison, and Ward speaks of a "stringent rule" broadly proscribing "evey procedure" which may lead to a "possible temptation" to be biased, it is arguable that the Tumey Court's reference to a "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" has become the defacto standard for assessing judicial bias claims. 179 See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the broad "Tumey test" ofjudicial bias claims).
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Judge Maloney is clearly disqualified in light of the extraordinary extent of his corruption. Moreover, neither the evidence offered against Bracy, nor the fact that his conviction was twice upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, should be relevant to whether his conviction warrants reversal. Dread of opening the floodgates to costly re-hearings is no excuse for judicial diffidence in Bracy's case. Lastly, if Bracy is to have significant impact, lower court judges will need to fashion remedies beyond the point where the Supreme Court feared to tread.
A. BRACY'S CONVICTION CALLED FOR OUTRIGHT REVERSAL
The Bracy Court strenuously resisted admitting the irrefutable conclusion that Maloney's presiding over the Bracy trial stripped that proceeding of any semblance of justice. Instead, turning a blind eye to the mandate established in Tumey and its progeny, '° the Court immersed itself in the procedural minutia of the habeas question. Indeed, the Court appeared to relegate the constitutional due process question to the status of a postulate of the procedural habeas corpus inquiry, all but admitting Maloney's constitutional inadequacy in order to explain why the petitioner was entitled to discovery to prove Maloney's constitutional inadequacy.""
The Court found the presumption ,in favor of Maloney's fairness "soundly rebutted." 182 It acknowledged the possibility that Bracy's trial attorney, privy to the corrupt scheme, may have agreed to take the case on a no-hassle fast-track to deflect suspicion from his suddenly risk-averse former associate (Maloney) .
However, the Court disingenuously discounted these probative findings as mere "additional evidence" and "specific allegations" necessary to support his discovery request. S. 57, 60 (1972) .
,8, An analogy could be made to a team of surgeons arguing that, because it has been discovered that the patient has a grapefruit-sized brain tumor, he has shown "good cause" to be granted permission to return to his doctor to try to persuade her that the original diagnosis of migraine was not the true cause of his headaches. 
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[Vol. 88 have found a prima facie showing ofjudicial bias and dispensed with the less important procedural question. Even assuming an improbably narrow reading of Tumey--that only a judge with a "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest may be deemed impermissibly biased' 8 -the Bracy Court should have reversed.
Maloney's Direct, Pecuniary Interest In The Bracy Trial
Judge Maloney had a financial stake in Bracy. Thomas Maloney's corruption began while he was a practicing attorney and took on a new dimension when he assumed the bench in
1977.
Before being snared in the Greylord investigation, Judge Maloney regularly received considerable cash payments from defendants facing him.lta Maloney's judicial office was, first and foremost, a money-making operation.' 9 Convicting those defendants who did not pay (such as William Bracy) served Judge Maloney's financial interest in three ways. First, it encouraged a defense attorney to "ante up" the next time he appeared before Maloney.' 9 0 Second, it sent a message to inter- 813 (1986) . Nonetheless, it does have some support. For example, the Court in Tumey expressly stated that "matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion." Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. Moreover, in Ward, Justices White and Rehnquist argued that Tumey should not be extended to control when the judge-mayor has no direct financial stake in the outcome of the trial. Ward, 409 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). See also Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 500 (commenting that the Court unjustifiably has been "extremely reluctant to disqualify ajudge when no direct financial interest is involved").
'87 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 696 (1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("It would seem, in any event, that by the time Maloney ascended to the bench in 1977, he was well groomed in the art ofjudicial corruption.").
"a8 United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1995) . For example, the court found that, in one murder prosecution, Maloney agreed to accept a bribe of $10,000. Id. at 655.
189 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 696 (Rovner, J., dissenting). Judge Rovner noted the "abundant proof (and a federal jury's finding) that justice was for sale in Maloney's courtroom." Id. (Rovner,J., dissenting).
"0 Recall the testimony of defense attorney William Swano: after having bribed the judge on several occasions, Swano neglected to do so on a slam-dunk case Swano described as "a not guilty in any courtroom in the building." Id. at 697 (Rovner,J., dissenting). When Maloney convicted his client anyway, Swano concluded that "to practice in front of Judge Maloney ... we had to pay." Id. (Rovner, J., dissenting) . Judge Rovner wrote, "One may infer from Swano's testimony that Maloney saw the ested members of the legal community (attorneys and clients) that 'justice" was available-for a price. As Judge Rovner put it, "fixed cases were a source of profit, whereas unfixed cases were an opportunity... to 'advertise' in the defense bar."' 9 ' If word got out that Maloney's courtroom was at all legitimate and a defendant could win a case on its merits, the judge's "credibility" would suffer. Third, convicting as many non-paying defendants as possible helped to keep Maloney in business.
9 2 Judge Rovner commented that this protected the "franchise by currying favor with law and order minded voters and avoiding the ire of the law enforcement community." 9 3
Continuing, for the moment, under the assumption that a financial stake is required to show judicial bias, how much is enough? The Tumey standard firmly established in American jurisprudence that any interest suffices that might "offer a possible temptation to the average man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof ... or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.' 94 A better question then, is "how much and how direct a financial interest must there be to create the 'possible temptation?"' 195 Two Supreme Court cases suggest that the interest need not be so direct, nor so substantial after all.'9 Though similar to Tumey, Ward differed factually in one key respect-there, the mayor-judge did not share directly in the fines levied by his court.' 9' Nonetheless, in Ward, the mayor's responsibility for village finances apparently was deemed a direct enough interest when a part thereof derived from courtimposed fines.' 8 The Ward Court implied that the "direct, perDavis prosecution, in which no bribe was tendered, as an opportunity to teach Swano a lesson that would ensure bribes in future cases." Id. (RovnerJ., dissenting) Likewise, in Aetna, Justice Brennan specifically explained that he did "not understand that by this [direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary] language the Court states that only an interest that satisfies this test will taint the judge's participation as a due process violation.' ' ,20 In fact, the Aetna Court held Judge Embry's interest to be "direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary" even though the judge had no direct financial stake. 2 0 1 A closer look at the facts of that case, however, again indicates that the Court used that language loosely. The Court founded its conclusion that Judge Embry had a "direct" interest on the theory that the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Aetna supposedly "raised the stakes ... [and enhanced ] the legal status and the settlement value of his own case. 2°2 If the Court deemed these clearly indirect financial interests sufficiently "direct," then surely it should have concluded that Maloney's interests were also sufficiently direct. Therefore, because Maloney had a "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" at stake in Bracy, the Supreme Court should have reversed the case outright.
"' 1&; see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (noting that "the pecuniary interest of the Mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here").
m Aetna, 475 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (pecuniary interest is merely among the "various situations [that] have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable"); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that " [o] f course, the Supreme Court has held the due process clause requires disqualification for interests besides pecuniary interests"). Even though Bracy satisfied the narrower Tumey test, he should not be burdened with its arbitrary distinction between financial and non-financial interests. The decision in Tumey offered no guidance in explaining why the former rises to a constitutional level but the latter does not. 2 3 Even discounting the financial interests involved, Judge Maloney had an equally urgent non-pecuniary motive-i.e., the desire to deflect suspicion from two contemporaneous, fixed cases. As Justice Brennan commented in Aetna: "tA]n interest is sufficiently direct if the outcome of the challenged proceeding substantially advances the judge's opportunity to attain some desired goal even if that goal is not actually attained in that proceeding."
The Court's post-Tumey judicial bias cases suggest a broader standard than the "financial interest only" interpretation. 5 Under this more plausible reading of the Tumey principle, the case for reversing Bracy's conviction is unassailable., The language of the judicial bias cases themselves, coupled with the extraordinary nature of Maloney's bias, demanded bold action by the Court. Moreover, public policy reinforces this conclusion.
The strongest support of an outright reversal of Bracy's conviction lies in the principle established in Tumey: that having any interest that "offer[s] a possible temptation to the average man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof.., or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true" disqualifies a judge from presiding over a case. 2° This concept has been conAs Redish and Marshall write: This distinction in constitutional treatment between personal bias and financial interest cannot be justified by a difference in the degree of temptation involved. Ajudge is likely to be far more concerned with giving his brother-in-law a break than with securing $5.00 for a traffic conviction. Similarly, the temptation to get revenge against a party that the judge dislikes may be as alluring as pecuniary gain. 20 For example, the Court in Tunzey reversed despite no indication whatsoever that this potential bias actually influenced the lower court's decisions, concluding that the prospect of a loss of twelve dollars in court costs was temptation enough. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. The Court in Aetna, though holding that the judge had a far more direct interest in the outcome of that case than was necessary for a bias claim, insisted that they need not decide whether a judge was influenced, but only whether presiding over the case might offer a "possible temptation." Aetna, 475 U.S. at 824-25. Similarly, the Court in Ward specifically rejected the argument that an Ohio statute was sufficient without federal interference to protect against judicial bias, arguing that "[i]f this means that an accused must show special prejudice in his particular case, the statute requires too much and protects too little." Ward, 409 U.S. at 61.
' Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; see also United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Few claims are more difficult to resolve than the claim that the trial judge, presiding over a jury trial, has thrown his weight in favor of one side to such an extent that it cannot be said that the trial has been a fair one.").
2 0 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 1996) . 21 See Ward, 409 U.S. at 60. The Court in Ward commented: "This... is a situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, and necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id. 1113 ence to this principle serves two public policy purposes. First, because not all improprieties are discernible," 4 such a rule lowers what could otherwise be prohibitively high evidentiary hurdles facing a petitioner. 5 The Court clearly has chosen to err on the side of caution by disqualifying a judge if she has some discernible possible bias. Second, endeavoring to avoid even the appearance of impropriety serves to reinforce the faith of the American people in the criminal justice system. 1 In other words, it accomplishes the critical goal of "generat[ing] the feeling, so important to a popular government, thatjustice has been done." 21 Lastly, the very pervasiveness of Judge Maloney's corruption required that Bracy's conviction be overturned. It is true that the Supreme Court recognizes that not every "possible temptation" mandates judicial disqualification . To weed out frivolous bias claims, the Court has enhanced the burden of persuasion, requiring the moving party to "overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." 9 This presumption inoculates a judge from disqualification for a minor but "possible" biasing influence. As the Bracy Court commented, "Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties . . . [b]ut, unfortu- nately, the presumption has been soundly rebutted: Maloney was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corruption through his servers have long understood that the appearance ofjustice is as important as its reality.").
" Redish & Marshall, supra note 51, at 483. See also Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority "for being naive about what the cold page of a trial record will reveal").
" 219 See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 826 (remarking that, at some point, a "biasing influence.. will be too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints").
2'9 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) .
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public trial and conviction." 22 0 Therefore, with Judge Maloney stripped of this protective presumption, the impact of his "possible temptation" should have been presumptively greater. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the Court evaluates judicial bias claims against the measuring stick of the "average" judge. 2 Maloney was far from average. 2 As his string of convictions proved, Judge Maloney acquitted murderers for a small payment of blood money. 3 As Judge Rovner remarked, "The victims of those crimes, their families, the people of Illinois, the concept of justice, [224] were apparently worth no more to him. " 2 Faced with a judge as corrupt as Maloney, the Bracy Court erred in applying a standard designed for the "average man." After all, as the Court asserted in Vasquez, " [w] hen the trial judge is discovered to have had some basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from review, and we must presume that the process was impaired.", 6 William Bracy deserved nothing less.
B. THE COURT'S RELUCTANCE TO REVERSE CONVICTION
There are several reasons why any court might resist overturning the conviction of a defendant like Bracy. The evidence against Bracy appears overwhelming. 22 7 However, the right to due process is not a function of the nature of the evidence offered against the accused. 8 The inculpatory evidence in Tumey ' Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. CL 1793 , 1799 (1997 . 2' See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) .
See Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting). Judge Rovner argues:
Maloney's bribetaking... [was not] just another "bias" or "influence," something external to his personality, or at least some severable part of it, that at most "might" have given him the "incentive" to behave in a particular fashion on occasions when he was not bribed .... Maloney's bribetaking removes him from the category of the "average" man... [and implicates] a far darker set of impulses than we confront in the usual bias case. Id, (Rovner,J., dissenting).
Id (Rovner,J., dissenting). I (Rovner,J., dissenting).
16 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) .
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 702-03 (Rovner,J., dissenting S. 57, 61 (1972) . 212 Id. Note that this argument would also violate the principle that constitutional structural defects in a case, such as judicial bias, require automatic reversal. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 283 (1993) .
Bracyv. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1798 n.6 (1997). The Court said, "We express no opinion on the correctness of the various discretionary rulings cited by petitioner as examples of Maloney's bias. We note, however, that many of these rulings have been twice upheld, and that petitioner's convictions and sentence have been twice affirmed, by the Illinois Supreme Court." Id. (citation omitted).
2' Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62. Furthermore, Judge Rovner took issue with this line of thinking:
It is no answer to the charge of corruption that Maloney's discretionary rulings on their face appear to fall within the realm of reason ...
[W]e assume that the reasonable judge does not act for malignant ends... [However, if] ajudge exercises her discretion for invidious reasons, she has exceeded her authority. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 1996) (RovnerJ., dissenting) .
Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62. As already explained, Maloney's incentive to convict was considerable. Moreover, even if the possibility of reversal was of concern to him, Judge Maloney knew how to arrive at an appeal-proof result. As Judge Rovner remarked, "A judge who wishes to be tough on the defendant need not adopt the manner of the Tasmanian Devil to do it." Bracy, 81 F.3d at 698-99 (RovnerJ., dissenting). See also supra note 140.
